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982 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:978 
CORPORATIONS AND INFORMATION: SECRECY, ACCESS, AND 
DISCLOSURE. By Russell B. Stevenson, Jr. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 1980. Pp. xi, 227. $17.95. 
The tremendous economic power wielded by large corporations 
has vast political and social repercussions. As this power expands, 
demands for regulation are heard with increasing frequency. These 
demands are counterbalanced, however, by a growing recognition of 
the vital contributions that large corporations make to our economic 
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well-being. "[P]ublic concern about the irresponsible and unac-
countable exercise of corporate power," in other words, "is matched 
by an equal worry about the economic inefficiencies often caused by 
the measures we have traditionally fallen back on to deal with that 
concern" (p. 5). 
In Corporations and Ieformation, Russell Stevenson advocates an 
alternative strategy for controlling corporate power, a strategy based 
on increasing the flow of information from corporations to govern-
ment and the market place. He believes that it is necessary "to reas-
sert some e.ff ective measure of social control over corporate 
activities" (p. 5), but that existing regulations are both expensive and 
unresponsive to societal needs. Stevenson's strategy relies on the 
ability of the public and private sectors to respond to the disclosure 
of undesirable corporate behavior. It is unfortunate, therefore, that 
he fails to demonstrate that increased disclosure will ever force 
changes in corporate policies. 
Stevenson's defense of additional disclosure proceeds in three 
steps. In Part I, he examines corporate interests in secrecy. His anal-
ysis concentrates on trade secret law and economic theories of com-
petition. Disclosure, he argues, increases market efficiency (p. 31 ), 
and serves a variety of governmental and consumer interests. Cor-
porate managers counter that public disclosure violates their para-
mount economic interest in privacy. But the 'right of privacy, 
Stevenson maintains, derives from complex social values that reflect 
the importance of the individual in society (p. 69). Corporations, in 
Stevenson's view, are not entitled to the same privacy rights as indi-
viduals, and, therefore, cannot conceal information that might em-
barrass management or reveal conflicts of interest.1 He further 
claims that secrecy is often used to perpetuate a powerful and ineffi-
cient corporate bureaucracy, and concludes: 
[T]he motivations underlying the corporate urge for secrecy are com-
plex and multifarious, and they are not at all limited to the considera-
tions of economic competition usually advanced in its defense. An 
examination of these motivations leads inevitably to the conclusion 
that the system would be much improved if some of the barriers of 
secrecy were broken down. [P. 68.] 
His support, however, is almost entirely anecdotal,2 and does not ap-
pear to justify- so sweeping a conclusion. 
1. Stevenson notes that disclosure of negative information can result in shareholder dissat-
isfaction and eventual removal of incumbent management; thus management has a personal 
interest in keeping poor performances secret. P. 53. · 
2. Stevenson describes an incident at a General Motors shareholder meeting where the 
chairman clumsily evaded questions regarding the ability of incumbent management to self-
perpetuate; he also examines the corporation's self-serving concern about its public image and 
how the fear of adverse publicity results in nondisclosure of information, the disclosure of 
which would not directly benefit the corporation; he cites several instances where corporations 
circumvented governmental disclcsure requirements by altering communication channels or 
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In Part II, Stevenson discusses a number of existing disclosure 
laws and suggests possible improvements. He canvasses disclosure 
methods designed to benefit both consumers and investors in a work-
man-like but unspectacular manner; the reader will find little new in 
either his criticisms or his suggested reforms. He notes, for example, 
the accounting profession's inability to develop a uniform, "mean-
ingful system of financial accounting" (p. 99), and agrees with the 
general criticism that potential liability discourages disclosure of 
"soft" information that investors would otherwise find useful. These 
criticisms, of course, have been widely discussed in the legal 
literature. 3 
Stevenson saves his most thoughtful analysis for Part III. There 
he argues that existing disclosure requirements have been effective, 
but insufficient. Corporations, he believes, feel pressure to respond 
to the increasing public demand for social accountability, but the 
benefits of candid disclosure of social performance are often out-
weighed by its economic and social costs. As a result, disclosure will 
not occur unless mandated by the government q,. 151). Stevenson 
thus advocates imposing federal disclosure requirements on large4 
publicly and privately held corporations because they exert market 
power that must be watched and controlled (pp. 183-85). Small cor-
porations, too weak to wield monopoly power, would be exempt 
from the new requirements. Stevenson's sensitivity to social issues 
(pp. 191-96), however, may leave the reader puzzled at the author's 
insistence that market power should be the sole determinant of the 
appropriateness of disclosure. 
The efficacy of his disclosure proposal, moreover, is undocu-
mented in a number of respects. Corporations are, Stevenson em-
phasizes, unwilling to disclose information voluntarily. Ensuring 
that they provide complete and accurate information may thus re-
quire an enforcement mechanism that rivals the scope and intru-
siveness of existing regulatory agencies. And Stevenson fails to 
demonstrate that the information he wants disclosed can be put in a 
simple and easily comprehensible form. More important, he does 
not adequately demonstrate that consumers or investors will use this 
information to increase the social accountability of large corpora-
tions. Consumers are concerned primarily with product prices and 
quality; investors are most interested in security, capital apprecia-
tion, and income. Stevenson assumes, without support, that individ-
methods so as to avoid literal application of the regulations to such communications. Pp. 52-
63. He also briefly analyzes bureaucratic inefficiencies caused by internal secrecy. Pp. 63-65. 
3. See, e.g., R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 161-204 (4th ed. 1977). 
4. Stevenson recognizes that any line drawn between large and small corporations will be 
arbitrary. But he proposes using a sales figure (a quarter of a billion dollars), number of 
employees (10,000), or minimum assets ($250 million) test; his primary consideration is the 
amount of power a corporation wields. P. 185. 
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uals will seek to exert pressure on corporations by changing their 
consumption and investment patterns. Finally, corporations might 
maintain a united front and refuse to accede to consumer or investor 
demands; if so, the disclosure proposal will inevitably fail. 
Corporations and I'!formation is a provocative look at controver-
sial issues. Public knowledge of corporate activity and power is 
clearly inadequate, and disclosure may indeed be a viable alternative 
to direct regulation. Stevenson, however, too quickly dismisses the 
need for secrecy, and assumes rather than proves that disclosure will 
increase the social accountability of large corporations. The author 
has an appealing theory but fails to prove his case.5 
5. Corporations and Information is also reviewed by Howell, Book Review, 67 A.B.A.J. 618 
(1981); Wilson, Book Review, 105 LIB. J. 1626 (1980). 
